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forcement of such decrees,28 and upon analogy to child support and
custody cases, where modification is generally allowed.'
Although the court in the principal case was under no constitutional
obligation to recognize the modifiable New Jersey decree, it is sub-
mitted that the instant decision is based upon sound policy considera-
tions. It seems unnecessary, unreasonable, and unfair to require plain-
tiff to travel 3000 miles across the continent to New Jersey from time
to time in order to obtain judgments for specific sums so as to satisfy
an artificial "finality" requirement. A requirement that the parties
return to F-1 to relitigate the decree because of changes in circum-
stances places upon the parties additional time delays and increased
expenses, which could otherwise be easily obviated. By recognition
and enforcement of a foreign decree as such, F-2 is simply accomplish-
ing the same result as theoretically would have obtained in F-1 if suit
had been brought there.30 When F-2, instead of enforcing the foreign
decree as such, adopts the decree as its own,31 or when it takes the
view that its decree supersedes 32 the foreign one, the only binding
limitations are those which the court imposes upon itself. When a
party's claim of a change in circumstances seems on the merits to
justify a modification, and where the forum is one of convenience to
both parties, F-2 should recognize and modify a modifiable foreign
alimony decree.
EVIDENCE--CONCLUSIVENESS OF A PARTY'S OWN ADVERSE TESTIMONY
Snittjer Grain Co. v. Koch, 71 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 1955)
Plaintiff brought an action for the purchase price of a corn drier,
alleging an oral contract of sale with defendant. While plaintiff's
direct evidence would ordinarily have been sufficient to take the case
to the jury,' he testified on cross-examination that he did not "sell"
the corn drier to defendant, but rather that defendant had "ordered"
lawful ways and means as is usual, and according to the source and practice
of the court; orders so made may be revised and altered by the court from
time to time as circumstances may require.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:50-37 (Supp. 1951), Robison v. Robison, 9 N.J. 288, 88 A.2d
202 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 829 (1952). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65.15
(1941) Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1950)..
28. §ee note 14 supra.
29. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614-15 (1947). See
also Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948); Lopez
v. Avery, 66 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1953); Durfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 200 .E.
395 (1936) ; Turnage v. Tyler, 183 Miss. 318, 184 So. 52 (1938) ; Setzer v. Setzer,
251 Wis. 234, 29 N.W.2d 62 (1947).
30.. See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 273.
31. Palen v. Palen, 12 Cal. App. 2d 357, 55 P.2d 228 (1936); Creager v.
Superior Court, 126 Cal. App. 280, 14 P.2d 552 (1932); Sackler v. Sackler, 47
So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1950). See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 266.
32. See, e.g., Durfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 200 N.E. 395 (1936).:
1. Snittjer Grgii Co. v. Koch, 71 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa 1955).
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the drier fromn the manufacturer. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evi-
dence, defendant's motion to dismiss was sustained on the ground that
plaintiff's "adverse admissions" conclusively proved that he had not
contracted to sell the drier to defendant. The Iowa Supreme Court
reversed, holding that plaintiff's adverse admissions were not "judicial
admissions," but were inaccurate legal "conclusions" as to what con-
stituted an "order" and "sale." and therefore were not conclusive in
view of other evidence presented favorable to plaintiff's case.2
When a party, preparatory to trial or during the course of trial,
expressly waives the necessity of proof of a fact alleged by his ad-
versary, such waiver is a "judicial admission" and is conclusive upon
the party. He is thereafter precluded from offering evidence in con-
tradiction of the "judicial admission," either by his own testimony or
by the testimony of other witnesses.4 The issue presented by the prin-
cipal case is whether the testimony of a party adverse to his own
cause should be given the effect of a judicial admission, i.e., whether
such testimony should conclusively bind the party.
Under the earlier view, testimony given by a party adverse to his
own cause is not given the effect of a judicial admission, but rather is
treated the same as the testimony of an ordinary witness.2 Since a
party is not bound as a matter of law by the adverse testimony of an
ordinary witness, he is not bound, under this view, by his own adverse
testimony. The jury is allowed to consider his damaging testimony
with all the other evidence presented.
A relatively recent view adheres to the approach that testimony
given by a party adverse to his own cause has the same effect as a
judicial admission. The party is conclusively bound by such testi-
mony -on the theory that a litigant cannot ask the court to believe he
Id. at 34.
3 The tekin "waiver" is used broadly here. Thus, a party who by failing to
deny an allegation in the pleading of his adversary is deemed to admit such allega-
tion would be considered to have "waived" the necessity of proof.
4, t* WioMonE, EvmsNcs §§ 2588, 2590 (3d ed. 1940).
o, Alamo v. Del Rosario, 98 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Kanopka v. Kanopka,
113 Conn. 30, 154 At!. 144 (1931); Wallach v. Paddock 49 N.M. 317, 163 P.2d
632 (1945), bee also McCoRMICK, EvWENCE § 243 (1954).
6, t WiMORE, EVIDENCE § 2594a (3d ed. 1940) ; McCoamncK, EVmENCE § 243
(1954).
7. Kansas Transp. Co. v. Browning, 219 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1955); Feary v.
Metropolitan Street Ry., 162 Mi. 75, 62 S.W. 452 (1901); Winkler v. City of
Columbus 149 Ohio St. 39, 77 N.E.2d 461 (1948); Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va.
450, 114 i.E. 652 (1922).
McCormick's statement [McCoRMIcx, EvmE c 515 (1954)] that a "party is
free to contradict, and thus correct, his own testimony," does not appear to be
fully supported by the cases. The party can contradict his own testimony only
when he can show that it comes within one of the qualifications of the nile-of-
conclusiveness relating to mistake and the like. See text supported by notes 9-14
infra,
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has not told the truth s To avoid the inevitable injustice of a rigid
application of this "rule-of-conclusiveness" there appears to be a
tendency among the courts to allow a party to change his own adverse
testimony where there is a likelihood there may have been a mistake,"
e.g., where comprehension may have been inaccurate because of a
physical defect, 10 or where testimony was given in response to a mis-
interpreted question," through oversight,12 through lack of definite
recollection,13 or in answer to a misleading question." Nor does the
rule apply to matters about which the party could easily have been
mistaken, e.g., testimony concerning estimates, 5 opinions," or con-
clusions.'7 The "rule-of-conclusiveness" courts tend to apply the rule
more rigidly when a party gives adverse testimony relating to subjec-
tive matters within his own special knowledge, 8 such as his motives,
purposes, and emotions,19 since the possibility of mistake is largely
eliminated in this area.2 0
8. Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 462, 114 S.E. 652, 656 (1922). See also
Harlow v. Leclair, 82 N.H. 506, 511, 136 Atl. 128, 130 (1927).
9. See, e.g., Coursen v. Goodloe, 267 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954);
Burruss v. Suddith, 187 Va. 473, 47 S.E.2d 546 (1948).
10. Phillips v. Vrooman, 361 Mo. 1098, 238 S.W.2d 355 (1951).
11. Hughes v. Greider, 194 Iowa 726, 190 N.W. 420 (1922); Smith v. Siercks,
277 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1955) (dictum).
12. Hewitt v. Katz Drug Co., 99 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. App. 1947) (party did not
notice that counsel's question misquoted her direct testimony); Smith v. Siercks,
277 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1955) (dictum).
13. Burruss v. Suddith, 187 Va. 473, 47 S.E.2d 546 (1948) ; Smith v. Sierchs,
277 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1955) (dictum).
14. Bagwell v. Susman, 165 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1947). The rule does not apply
to adverse testimony given in a previous trial, Steele v. Kansas City So. Ry.,
302 Mo. 207, 257 S.W. 756 (1924), or in a deposition, Leonard v. City of Man-
chester, 96 N.H. 115, 70 A.2d 915 (1950) ; Short v. White, 234 Mo. App. 499, 133
S.W.2d 1039 (1939).
15. Gulf, M. & O.R.R. v. Williamson, 191 F.2d 887 (8th Cir. 1951); Harry v.
Thompson, 166 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. App. 1942). But see Jackson v. Mannor, 90
Ohio App. 424, 107 N.E.2d 151 (1951) (defendant bound by his own testimony
as to the plaintiff's speed).
16. Shearron v. Shearron, 219 Miss. 27, 68 So. 2d 71 (1953).
17. Sheffield v. Chicago, 328 Ill. App. 321, 65 N.E.2d 486 (1946); Gramar
Inv. Co. v. Cumberworth, 120 Ind. App. 379, 92 N.E.2d 736 (1950); Smith v.
Siercks, 277 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1955) (party not bound where testimony related
to his impressions when at time of observation he was in imminent peril).
18. McCormick treats the "special knowledge" qualification as a category
distinct from the rule-of-conclusiveness category. McCoRMICK, EVInENCE § 243(1954). It would seem, however, that the special knowledge aspect is also rec-
ognized by courts applying the rule-of-conclusiveness. See Mollman v. Pub. Serv.
Co., 192 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. App. 1946).
19. Harlow v. Leclair, 82 N.H. 506, 136 Atl. 128 (1927). The Harlow case
sets out five considerations to be used in determining the conclusiveness of a
party's own adverse testimony:
1) Was the party at the time when the occurrence about which he testified
took place, and when he testified, in full possession of his mental faculties?
2) Was his intelligence and command of English such that he fully understood
the purport of the questions and his answers thereto?
3) What was the'nature of the facts to which he testified? ....
4) Is his testimony contradicted by that of other witnesses?
5) Is the effect of his testimony clear and unequivocal, or are his statements
inconsistent and conflicting?
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Since the adverse testimony related by the plaintiff in the principal
case was in the nature of a legal conclusion, the case may be explained
simply as an application of one of the accepted qualifications of the
rule-of-conclusiveness.Z To this extent the case is consistent with
earlier Iowa law.-; In its decision, however, the court adopted as the
proper approach in determining the effect of an adverse admission
the language of a Connecticut case: "[T] estimony of a party to a fact
is ordinarily no more conclusive upon him than the evidence given by
any other witness. . . "-" This language is a clear indication that the
court intends to discard the rule-of-conclusiveness that had been ac-
cepted in prior Iowa decisions. Subsequent cases may attempt to
characterize this portion of the opinion as obiter dictum, but the clear
import of the decision indicates that the Iowa Supreme Court is defi-
nitely committed to rejecting the rule-of-conclusiveness.
It would seem that the court has correctly determined that damag-
ing statements made by a party on the witness stand should not be
treated as a judicial admission. " When a party makes a judicial ad-
mission- , he realizes that he will be unable to subsequently controvert
the admission. In most cases he acts with the advice of counsel and
can carefully consider the effect the admission will have on his case.
When a party makes an adverse admission while testifying, however,
the rapid-fire question-answer experience of testifying seldom allows
adequate time to thoroughly consider a question. In most instances
the adverse statements are developed on cross-examination, where the
untrained, responsive witness is often maneuvered by a skillful cross-
examiner into damaging testimony which often does not accurately
portray the actual happening of events. Even when the adverse
statements are made on direct examination, the possibility of inad-
vertent mistake may cast doubt on the validity of such testimony. It
is not proposed, of course, that such adverse statements should not be
c"ns-idered by the jury; indeed, such testimony, unless adequately ex-
fd at 51,, 136 At. at 131, See also Reynolds r. Sullivan, 330 Mass. 549 116
N.E 2d 128 (1953); Zamora v. Thompson, 250 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
2., Even in this situation, however, the courts are reluctant to apply the rule
if towhe exists a likelihood of mistake. See MlcHaady v. Standard Oil Co. 231
Minn. 493, 44 N.W.2d 90 (1950). See also Waldo v. St. Paul City Ry., 70 N.W.2d
2.1 iUirin. 195); Cote v. Stafford, 94 Nil. 251, 51 A.2d 144 (1947) (stating
that when testimonyv relates to matters within a party's special knowledge the
u .f-o1conerlusiveness does not apply if the jury can find the party was hones t
n,,,ta.dr); Isabelle v, Crystal Laundry, Inc., 93 N.H. 264, 41 A.2d 241 (1945).
See McCorMI.cK, E viUNCE § 243 (1954) criticizing the assumption that a party
is not likely to be mistaken as to facts in his own special knowledge.
21. See text supported h note 17 supra.
'2,See Hinkson v. Morrison, 47 Iowa 167? (1877).
3,t Kanopka v. Kanopka, 113 Conn. 30, 154 AtI. 144 (1931).
214. Wimorm, Eiwsxcs § 2594a (3d ed. 1940). See also Alamo v. Del
Rosario, 98 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
2,k See text supported by note 3 supra.
26 MlcCoanics, ExmEwcE § 243 (1954).
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plained, will generally weigh heavily against the party in the minds of
the jury. But it does not seem that a party's adverse testimony should
be automatically considered conclusive. The many qualifications rec-
ognized by courts applying the rule-of-conclusiveness are adequate in-
dications of the weakness of the rule itself. The continued use of a
rule that is encompassed by so many qualifications can only produce
protracted litigation, as losing parties seek appellate rulings on
whether a particular admission was or was not within a recognized
exception to the rule. The earlier approach, treating a party's adverse
statements the same as those of any other witness, seems to provide a
more flexible and desirable method of dealing with a party's adverse
testimony. It is to be hoped that more courts will pursue the course
indicated by the court in the principal case and reject the rule-of-
conclusiveness, for "The truth of the case depends on a comparison of
what all the witnesses say and all the circumstances indicate.'27
TORTS-GUEST STATUTE-STATUS OF RIDER LEGALLY OBLIGATED
TO PAY FOR TRANSPORTATION
In re Dikeman's Estate, 178 Kan. 188, 284 P.2d 622 (1905)
Plaintiff and defendant's decedent agreed that plaintiff would ride
in decedent's car and pay a reasonable sum for transportation to and
from a fraternal meeting. The amount to be paid was to be deter-
mined after the return home. On the return trip decedent's car col-
lided with a train, causing decedent's death and injury to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff sued decedent's estate, alleging ordinary negligence, and the
trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer. The Kansas Supreme
Court, three justices dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, holding that plaintiff was within the Kansas "guest" statute
and, therefore, was precluded from recovery on the basis of ordinary
negligence.1
At common law the driver of an automobile has a duty to exercise
ordinary and reasonable care for the protection of a guest.2 Since
27. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2594a n.16 (3d ed. 1940). For an extensive review
of the cases on the subject, see Annot., 169 A.L.R. 798 (1947).
The courts in Missouri have followed the rule-of-conclusiveness in dealing with
a party's own adverse testimony. Smith v. Siercks, 277 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1955);
Steele v. Kansas City So. Ry., 265 Mo. 97, 175 S.W. 177 (1915). See also Moll-
man v. Pub. Serv. Co., 192 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. App. 1946) (refusing to recognize
exception to rule because testimony related to evidence in party's own special
knowledge). 9 WIGMDRE, EVIDENCE § 2594a (Supp. 1955) lists the many excep-
tions to the rule recognized by Missouri courts.
1. In 'e Dikeman's Estate, 178 Kan. 188, 284 P.2d 622 (1955).
2. PRossER, TORTS 451 (2d ed. 1955). Missouri by statute requires the operator
of a motor vehicle to "exercise the highest degree of care." Mo. REV. STAT. §
304.010 (1949). This standard of care represents the driver's duty to his guest.
Kaley v. Huntley, 333 Mo. 771, 63 S.W.2d 21 (1933).
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